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Sieglinde Gstöhl and Sofía López 
The longstanding scholarly and policy debate about what 
kind of regional or international actor the European Union 
(EU) is and what role it plays in its neighbourhood is far from 
over. Concepts describing the EU as a ‘normative power’ or 
empire have shown remarkable resilience despite multiple 
crises both in the neighbourhood (Arab Spring, Ukraine) and 
in the EU itself (economic crisis, so-called migration and 
refugee crisis, Brexit). This policy brief asks to what extent 
those concepts are indeed appropriate and useful. It 
highlights shortcomings, such as their limited substantial 
and geographical focus, and advocates a broadening of the 
analytical frame. In order to capture the EU’s role in its 
entire neighbourhood, the notion of an ‘accidental regional 
hegemon’ is suggested as a more accurate 
conceptualisation. Rethinking the EU’s role in terms of the 
‘4 Ps’ has significant policy implications for both the Union 
and its neighbours.  
When speaking about the EU’s neighbourhood, there is a 
tendency to think only about those countries that are either 
candidates for membership or included in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Yet, there are also other 
neighbouring countries such as the members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) – Switzerland, Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein – and the small states Andorra, Monaco 
and San Marino which are part of the EU’s customs territory. 
What these countries have in common is their lack of appetite 
to join the EU. One might add the case of Turkey, where 
attention has recently shifted from the stalled accession talks 
to a modernisation of the customs union as a potential 
alternative form of partnership. The Brexit debate has helped 
push these countries into the limelight as the United Kingdom 
is negotiating its future relationship with the European 
Union. Despite these developments, the concepts available 
for understanding the EU as a regional actor tend to neglect 
the Western neighbourhood and the full range of the EU’s 
(un)intentional norm export. Norms are thereby understood 
as encompassing political values, but also economic and 
institutional rules. 
‘Normative power Europe’ is only part of the story 
The concepts of ‘normative power’, ‘normative empire’ or 
‘normative hegemon’ capture merely part of the EU’s 
relations with its neighbours for three main reasons: first, 
they focus only on the promotion of political values; second, 
they concentrate geographically on the EU’s Eastern and 
Executive Summary 
> Drawing on a definition by Miriam Prys, this policy brief 
conceptualises the European Union as an ‘accidental 
regional hegemon’ in its neighbourhood, based on ‘4 Ps’: 
(1) the provision of regional public goods, (2) internal and 
external perceptions, (3) the projection of political, 
economic and institutional norms, including EU acquis, 
and (4) the (limited) participation of neighbours in EU 
structures and policies. 
> As such, the EU has since the 1990s intentionally or 
inadvertently ‘exported’ not just political values but 
various types of norms to a growing number of Western 
Eastern and Southern neighbouring countries. Yet, the 
EU needs to become more aware of the implications of 
its accidental hegemony. It needs to supply the right 
regional public goods, manage perceptions, monitor the 
projected norms and offer close neighbours ways to 
participate in their making. 
> The neighbours also need to better understand the EU’s 
accidental hegemony: what it can realistically offer and 
what they may in turn have to contribute, or how to deal 
with trade-offs between market access and participatory 
gaps in governance. 
> Finally, the EU needs to rethink not only the future of its 
internal differentiation but also offer external 
differentiated integration in the form of viable 
alternatives to full membership. 
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Southern neighbourhood; and third, they overestimate the 
EU’s active empire-building efforts.  
For Manners (2002), who coined the seminal notion 
‘normative power Europe’, the EU is a value-driven foreign 
policy actor based on the core norms that form its own 
identity (such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and 
respect for human rights) and which enable it to some extent 
to define what passes for ‘normal’ in international affairs.  
Other authors contend that the EU’s way of interacting with 
the candidate and ENP countries matches that of empires. 
For Zielonka the enlarged EU resembles a kind of ‘neo-
medieval empire’ with overlapping jurisdictions and 
considerable heterogeneity, doomed to further enlarge and 
decentralise. According to him, the study of empires requires 
to focus on the scope and structure of their governance, the 
nature of their (fluctuating) borders, their centre-periphery 
relations and civilising missions (Zielonka 2011: 283). In the 
same vein, Del Sarto (2016: 216) argues that ‘normative 
empires’ – like the EU – “have sought to stabilize the 
periphery, to draw economic advantages from it, to export 
the imperial order, [and to] cultivate elites there” whilst 
“engag[ing] in some sort of ‘civilizing mission’ linked to a 
normative perception of themselves”. Although this value-
based conception partially accounts for the EU’s relations 
with its Eastern and Southern neighbours, it falls short of 
providing an understanding of the EU’s approach to its 
Western, ‘like-minded’ neighbours such as the EFTA 
countries or the UK. These countries are not in transition 
from authoritarian or communist regimes to democracies 
and a ‘civilising mission’ is a priori unnecessary. In addition, 
they show that the EU ‘empire’ is not perpetually enlarging.  
The Union has become an international regulatory actor and 
the sheer size of its internal market acts like a magnet. 
Especially in its proximity the EU constitutes an interest-
driven ‘market power’ externalising economic and social 
market-related policies and regulatory measures (Damro 
2012: 682). Firms that want to export goods to or provide 
services in the EU’s internal market may need to change their 
product standards and practices. Having done so, they may 
apply EU standards, which often tend to be at the higher end, 
also elsewhere. Also foreign governments may choose to 
align their rules with EU norms unilaterally, as a result of 
bilateral negotiations or of EU activism in international 
standard-setting bodies. 
Additionally, Haukkala’s (2017: 78) conceptualisation of the 
EU as a ‘regional normative hegemon’ that “engages itself in 
deliberate attempts at active norm transference” through 
highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships should also be 
cautiously applied, as the EU does not always purposely try 
to transfer its norms. Georgia after the Rose Revolution in 
2003, for instance, sought the EU’s support and went as far 
as declaring its wish to become a member thereof. One of the 
immediate results was the inclusion of this country – as well 
the other two South Caucasian republics Armenia and 
Azerbaijan – in a policy, the ENP, that was first meant to 
target Eastern European countries and then those included in 
the so-called Barcelona process in the Southern 
Mediterranean. In other words, the EU did not knock on 
Georgia’s door, but Tbilisi took the initiative.  
Another illustrative example of the lack of a deliberate EU 
attempt to transfer its norms is the principle of ‘autonomous 
adaptation’ introduced by the EFTA countries in the late 
1980s. This principle entails that said countries would bring 
their national law as close as possible to EU law and thus ex 
ante voluntarily scrutinise the EU-compatibility of new legal 
acts. Although the logic of ‘autonomous adaptation’ lost 
importance after most EFTA countries became members of 
the European Economic Area (EEA), it is still a guiding 
principle for Switzerland – and may become one for the UK.  
Hence, a broader notion that captures all shades of the EU’s 
neighbourhood relations is needed. Such a concept should 
reflect both the EU’s active promotion of different types of 
norms and the neighbours’ voluntary alignment. Finally, it 
must also expose the imbalance of power between the EU 
and its neighbours.  
The EU as a regional hegemon ‘by accident’ 
Miriam Prys (2010) identifies three constitutive features of 
regional hegemony, that is, the role of a dominant power in a 
geographical region (‘3 Ps’): the provision of regional public 
goods, the self- and external perceptions of the regional 
power as an actor with a special responsibility and the 
capacity to have an impact in its sphere of influence, as well 
as the projection of the regional power’s values and interests 
through both socialisation and manipulation of incentives. 
Given that Prys’ analysis focuses not on the EU but big states 
in other regions of the world, we add a fourth ‘P’ that is 
specific to the EU, namely participation of the neighbours in 
the structures, decision-making processes and policies of the 
regional hegemon.  
The term hegemon implies that there is a power asymmetry 
between the actors. This may involve material capabilities but 
also soft power resources. The adjective ‘accidental’ conveys 
that the EU has grown into this role, at times even trying to 
avoid new membership applications by offering alternatives 
such as the EEA or the ENP and Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). It also encompasses both 
deliberate attempts and unintentional effects at exporting 
the hegemon’s norms, be they political, economic or 
institutional, and this to all geographical neighbours.  
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Provision of regional public goods 
The provision of regional public goods typically requires cross-
border collective action. As a peace project, the EU has for 
many decades ensured security and political stability among 
its members, while reaching out to the candidates for 
accession. Through the ENP it is attempting – albeit with great 
difficulty – to export this stability into the broader 
neighbourhood as well. In addition, the EU’s internal market 
– the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital – 
provides economic public goods for its members as well as to 
some extent for the countries in the neighbourhood and 
beyond. The EU has removed restrictions on capital flows also 
for third countries, it is setting many international standards, 
foreign products circulate freely once they have entered the 
customs union, and the Schengen area allows all people to 
travel without border controls. The euro has become an 
international currency and serves as a legal tender in non-EU 
neighbours like Andorra, Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino, 
and the Vatican. Other regional public goods are 
improvements in public health or the environment and the 
creation of cross-border infrastructure. 
Perceptions of the EU 
The fact that the EU sees itself as a community of values 
shines through many Treaty provisions. According to Art. 2 
TEU, the Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. Acceding countries must accept 
these values and promote them (Art. 49 TEU). This self-
perception, implicitly, vests a special responsibility on the EU 
vis-à-vis its neighbourhood in particular and the world in 
general. In this context, it is not surprising that the EU views 
itself as the dominant actor in Europe whose enlargement 
was “a success story” not only for the Union, but for “Europe 
as a whole” (European Council 2006). 
As a matter of fact, Art. 8 TEU of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates 
that the Union shall develop a special relationship with 
neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values 
of the Union. To that end, the EU may, for instance, conclude 
specific agreements with the countries concerned. Although 
this article has so far never been used as a legal basis of an 
international agreement, it embodies the idea of holding a 
special responsibility for the neighbourhood. In a declaration 
attached to Art. 8, the EU even pledges “to take into account 
the particular situation of small-sized countries which 
maintain specific relations of proximity with it”. 
The external image that the neighbours have of the EU is not 
monolithic, and the level of public awareness of the EU is 
greater in its geographic proximity than further afar (Lucarelli 
2014). Generally, the EU is primarily perceived as an 
economic giant. In 2012, it was, however, awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize for over six decades of contribution to the 
advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and 
human rights in Europe. External perceptions are shaped by 
a myriad of elements such as a country’s geopolitical 
situation, its history with and dependence on the EU or the 
Union’s internal situation and the coherence of its external 
action. The impact of the EU’s recent economic and financial 
crisis, so-called migration and refugee crisis and the Brexit 
vote as well as crises in the neighbourhood such as the Arab 
Spring or the conflict in Ukraine are certainly felt in terms of 
reputation.  
The external image and acceptance of the EU in its 
neighbourhood is also affected by the regional public goods 
and other benefits (or obligations) provided. For example, 
whereas some neighbours such as the EFTA states provide 
financial assistance to the EU’s own regional cohesion, others 
such as the ENP countries are recipients of vast sums of EU 
aid for their own development.  
Projection of norms 
The European Union projects its norms in the wider 
neighbourhood through the promotion of political values as 
well as economic and institutional rules. Since the end of the 
Cold War, political conditionality has increasingly been added 
to aid and trade instruments (e.g. human rights clauses) 
beyond candidates for accession. However, the EU has not 
engaged in the promotion of political values in countries that 
it sees as ‘like-minded’. In fact, neither the bilateral 
agreements with Switzerland and the small-sized countries 
nor the EEA Agreement contain a human rights clause.  
More recently, the innovative ‘market access conditionality’ 
included in the DCFTAs already signed with some Eastern ENP 
countries further testifies to the hegemonic character of the 
EU. This type of conditionality means that additional access 
of these countries to the internal market will be contingent 
upon the successful completion of their legislative 
approximation commitments. Through the DCFTAs, and even 
more so through the European Economic Area, the customs 
union agreements with Turkey, Andorra and San Marino or 
certain bilateral sectoral agreements with Switzerland, the 
EU exports parts of its acquis communautaire, which is often 
referred to as ‘EU external governance’. In turn, the 
neighbours concerned may to a limited extent participate in 
governance mechanisms.  
Lavenex, Lehmkuhl and Wichmann (2009: 829) explain the 
differences between the applicable modes of governance in 
different policy areas in the EU’s neighbourhood with “the 
pre-eminence of institutional continuities between the ways 
in which the EU governs internally and its external modes of 
governance”. In other words, it matters for the institutional 
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arrangements which areas of cooperation are included in a 
third country’s relationship with the EU. 
Participation in EU structures and policies  
The analytical toolbox put forward by Prys to identify a 
regional hegemon has to be complemented in the case of the 
EU by the participation of neighbours in its structures and 
policies and the possibility to apply to join the hegemon. 
Third countries may take part in many EU programmes, 
agencies or policies ranging from aviation or Schengen to 
restrictive measures and Common Defence and Security 
Policy missions. The degree of participation in the decision-
making process depends in particular on whether an 
agreement aims at legal homogeneity (the same EU rules 
apply and are interpreted in the same way), but also on a 
neighbour’s relative bargaining power.  
In case of international agreements, participation is 
channelled through fora like Association Councils or joint 
committees, where representatives from both sides meet. In 
some cases, such as the EEA, the customs union with Turkey 
or select bilateral agreements with Switzerland, the European 
Commission is seeking informal consultation regarding its 
legislative proposals and experts may take part in the 
preparatory work of certain committees. These ‘decision-
shaping’ rights in view of the adoption of the resulting acquis 
by the neighbouring countries is most developed in the two-
pillar structure of the EEA. By contrast, it has been working 
less efficiently in the Euro-Turkish customs union and is not 
foreseen in the EU’s current relations with the small-sized 
countries despite their inclusion in the EU’s customs union, 
nor in the ENP DCFTAs.  
At the moment, the EU is negotiating its future relations with 
the UK but also an institutional umbrella agreement with 
Switzerland and modern association agreements with 
Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. As argued by Tobler (2016: 
591), the EU’s attitude towards the institutional framework 
of acquis-based market access agreements with Western 
European states has evolved over time, and it is fraught with 
specific governance questions: the homogeneous 
interpretation of agreements with the EU law from which 
they are derived; international supervision to monitor 
compliance; the settlement of disputes between the 
contracting parties; and the updating of the agreement in the 
light of new EU law. The Union has been insisting on a balance 
of rights and obligations and on safeguarding the autonomy 
of its legal order. 
Overall, the demand for closer relations with the EU has since 
the end of the Cold War steadily increased, and the EU has 
indeed become an ‘accidental regional hegemon’. What does 
this insight imply for the EU as well as for its neighbours? 
 
Policy implications of the EU’s accidental hegemony  
Both the European Union and its neighbours have to take the 
‘4 Ps’ seriously: they share an interest in the provision of 
regional public goods, they operate based on (internal and 
external) perceptions, they supply or demand norm 
projection, and participation in the making of such norms 
constitutes a legitimate concern. At least six lessons can be 
drawn from this. 
First, the conception of the EU as a ‘normative power’ 
projecting political values onto its neighbourhood, often by 
means of conditionality, needs to be broadened: the EU has 
since the 1990s intentionally or inadvertently ‘exported’ 
various types of (political, economic and institutional) norms 
to a growing number of Western, and not just Eastern and 
Southern neighbouring countries.  
Second, in order to remain attractive, the EU needs to supply 
regional public goods and appealing policies and effectively 
manage any crises that might arise. The ENP, for instance, 
aims at expanding the ‘zone of prosperity, stability and 
security’ beyond the EU. Moreover, in case of close 
partnerships based on parts of the acquis, the EU must 
acknowledge the neighbours’ sovereignty concerns and offer 
some form of (albeit limited) participation. In order to garner 
support and counter misconceptions, the EU has to further 
strengthen the communication of its policies internally and 
its public diplomacy externally. In this context, competition 
from other regional players (such as the Eurasian Economic 
Union on the Eastern flank) or the withdrawal of EU member 
states are no longer inconceivable.  
Third, the EU’s neighbours should understand that the more 
market access they want, the more they will have to align 
with the relevant acquis without being a member of the club 
and thus lacking real decision-making powers. Moreover, 
they might have to contribute their share to the provision of 
regional public goods, including through the ‘import’ of EU 
norms or through financial support.  
Fourth, the EU’s membership has become more 
heterogeneous and its efforts at deepening integration have 
been characterised by more flexibility. The resulting internal 
differentiation, where not all member states participate in all 
initiatives (such as in the economic and monetary union, 
Schengen or forms of enhanced cooperation), might have led 
to less flexibility in its neighbourhood relations. This is 
illustrated by the EU’s attempt at streamlining the available 
models to the detriment of new ‘bespoke’ arrangements, as 
can be seen in the ongoing negotiations with Switzerland and 
the small-sized countries but also with the UK. Moreover, 
across all relationships, the EEA has been referred to as the 
blueprint. However, the EU needs to review not only the 
future of internal differentiated integration and enhanced 
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cooperation to accommodate the member states’ diverse 
preferences, but it also has to rethink the future of external 
differentiation in terms of viable alternatives to EU 
membership for its neighbours. 
Fifth, the EU’s neighbours should therefore expect political 
linkages to be made, for fear of setting a precedent. Any EU 
concessions in the Swiss-EU negotiations will have 
repercussions on the Brexit negotiations and vice versa. Yet, 
the EU should be aware that by linking parallel negotiation 
processes it is likely to generate a negative impact on the way 
it is perceived as well as on its effective norm projection, 
whether deliberately or not, in the neighbourhood.  
Sixth, the EU should be reminded that history shows that 
hegemons may eventually suffer a decline – or an ‘imperial 
overstretch’, a concept which suggests that an empire can 
unintentionally extend itself beyond its ability to maintain or 
expand its commitments. Hence, the EU must insist on the 
fulfilment of all criteria for future enlargement rounds and it 
must equally monitor the member states for compliance with 
all types of norms. The power of the hegemon may be eroded 
from inside but also by major international power shifts. 
Therefore, the Union needs to consolidate its position as a 
global actor, guided by ‘principled pragmatism’ in – as the EU 
Global Strategy considers – ‘a more connected, contested 
and complex world’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Views expressed in the College of Europe Policy Briefs are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect positions 
of either the series editors or the College of Europe. Free online subscription at www.coleurope.eu/CEPOB. 
Sources 
Damro, C. (2012) “Market Power Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 682-699. 
Del Sarto, R. (2016) “Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its 
Borderlands, and the ‘Arab Spring’”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 
54, no. 2, pp. 215-232. 
European Council (2006) “Presidency Conclusions of 14-15 December 
2006”, 16879/1/06, Brussels, 12 February. 
Haukkala, H. (2017) “The EU’s Regional Normative Hegemony Encounters 
Hard Realities: The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy and the Ring of 
Fire”, in D. Bouris & T. Schumacher (eds), The Revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Basingstoke, Palgrave, pp. 77-94. 
Lavenex, S., D. Lehmkuhl & N. Wichmann (2009) “Modes of External 
Governance: A Cross-national and Cross-sectoral Comparison”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 813-833. 
Lucarelli, S. (2014) “Seen from the Outside: The State of the Art on the 
External Image of the EU”, European Integration, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 1-16. 
Manners, I. (2002) “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258. 
Prys, M. (2010) “Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional 
Powerhood”, International Studies Review, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 479-504. 
Tobler, C. (2016) “One of Many Challenges After ‘Brexit’: The Institutional 
Framework of an Alternative Agreement – Lessons from Switzerland and 
Elsewhere?”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 23, 
no. 4, pp. 575-594. 
Zielonka, J. (2011) “The EU as an International Actor: Unique or Ordinary?”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 281-301. 
--- 
This Policy Brief is loosely inspired by the results of the conference “The EU’s 
‘Privileged Partnerships’ with its Neighbours: An Institutional Perspective”, 
held at the College of Europe in Bruges on 25 January 2018. 
About the Authors 
Sieglinde Gstöhl is Director of the 
Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies at 
the College of Europe in Bruges. 
Before joining the College as 
Professor in 2005, she was at the 
Institute of Social Sciences at 
Humboldt University Berlin, the 
Liechtenstein-Institut in Bendern and 
the Center for International Affairs at 
Harvard University in Cambridge, 
MA. She holds degrees from the 
Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies in Geneva 
and from the University of St. Gallen. 
Her main research interests include 
EU external relations, diplomacy, 
international political economy and 
International Relations theories. 
ofía López is an Academic Assistant 
in the Department of EU 
International Relations and 
Diplomacy Studies at the College of 
Europe. She holds an MA in European 
Interdisciplinary Studies from the 
College of Europe and a BA in 
International Relations from 
Complutense University of Madrid. 
Her main research interests include 
EU enlargement, Soviet and post-
Soviet area studies, Turkish studies, 
gender studies and the Balkans. 
